| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12571 |
| DP12571 Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement | |
| Marina Halac; Pierre Yared | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-05 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a fiscal policy model in which the government is present-biased towards public spending. Society chooses a fiscal rule to trade off the benefit of committing the government to not overspend against the benefit of granting it flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. Unlike prior work, we characterize rules that are self-enforcing: the government must prefer to comply with the rule rather than face the punishment that follows a breach, where any such punishment must also be self-enforcing. We show that the optimal rule is a maximally enforced deficit limit, which, if violated, leads to the worst punishment for the government. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the government to violate the deficit limit following sufficiently high shocks. Punishment takes the form of temporary overspending, after which the optimal rule is restored. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics and Growth ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Self-enforcing rules Private information Fiscal policy Deficit bias |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12571 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541382 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marina Halac,Pierre Yared. DP12571 Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement. 2018. |
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