| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12542 |
| DP12542 Meetings and Mechanisms | |
| Pieter A. Gautier; Xiaoming Cai; Ronald Wolthoff | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-24 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms. A general meeting technology governs how buyers and sellers meet. We introduce a one-to-one transformation of this meeting technology that helps to clarify and extend many of the existing results in the literature, which has focused on two special cases: urn-ball and bilateral meetings. We show that the optimal mechanism for sellers is to post auctions combined with a reserve price equal to their own valuation and an appropriate fee (or subsidy) which is paid by (or to) all buyers meeting the seller. Even when there are externalities in the meeting process, the equilibrium is efficient. Finally, we analyze the sorting patterns between heterogeneous buyers and sellers and show under which conditions high-value sellers attract more high-value buyers in expectation. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Search frictions Matching function Competing mechanisms Meeting technology |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12542 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541353 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pieter A. Gautier,Xiaoming Cai,Ronald Wolthoff. DP12542 Meetings and Mechanisms. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
