| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12529 |
| DP12529 Distortion by Audit: Evidence from Public Procurement | |
| Maria Paula Gerardino; Stephan Litschig; Dina Pomeranz | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-21 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Public sector audits are a key element of state capacity. However, we find that they can create unintended distortions. Regression discontinuity analysis from Chile shows that audits lowered the use of competitive auctions for public procurement, reduced supplier competition, and increased the likelihood of incumbent, small, and local firms winning contracts. We also find suggestive evidence of a price increase. Looking inside the black box of the audit process reveals that relative to comparable direct contracts, auctions underwent more than twice as many checks and led to twice as many detected infractions. These findings show that standard audit protocols can mechanically discourage the use of more regulated, complex and transparent procedures that involve more auditable steps. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12529-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541340 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maria Paula Gerardino,Stephan Litschig,Dina Pomeranz. DP12529 Distortion by Audit: Evidence from Public Procurement. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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