| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12443 |
| DP12443 Schumpeterian Banks: Credit Reallocation and Capital Structure | |
| Christian Keuschnigg; Michael Kogler | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-11-16 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Capital reallocation from unprofitable to profitable firms is a key source of productivity gain in an innovative economy. We present a model of credit reallocation and focus on the role of banks: Weakly capitalized banks hesitate to write off non-performing loans to avoid a violation of regulatory requirements or even insolvency. Such behavior blocks credit reallocation to expanding industries and results in a distorted investment process and low aggregate productivity. Reducing the cost of bank equity, tightening capital requirements, and improving insolvency laws relaxes constraints and mitigates distortions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Banking Credit reallocation Regulations Finance and growth |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12443 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541254 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christian Keuschnigg,Michael Kogler. DP12443 Schumpeterian Banks: Credit Reallocation and Capital Structure. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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