| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12440 |
| DP12440 Winning Connections? Special Interests and the Sale of Failed Banks | |
| Wolf Wagner; Thomas Lambert | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-11-15 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how lobbying affects the resolution of failed banks, using a sample of FDIC auctions between 2007 and 2014. We show that bidding banks that lobby regulators have a higher probability of winning an auction. In addition, the FDIC incurs higher costs in such auctions, amounting to 16.4 percent of the total resolution losses. We also find that lobbying winners have worse operating and stock market performance than their non-lobbying counterparts, suggesting that lobbying results in a less efficient allocation of failed banks. Our results provide new insights into the bank resolution process and the role of special interests. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank resolution Failed banks Financial crisis Lobbying Rent seeking |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12440 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541251 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wolf Wagner,Thomas Lambert. DP12440 Winning Connections? Special Interests and the Sale of Failed Banks. 2017. |
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