| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12318 |
| DP12318 Changes in CEO Stock Option Grants: A Look at the Numbers | |
| Daniel Ferreira | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-09-20 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study changes in CEO stock option grants. Unlike most of the literature, we focus on the number rather than the value of options granted. We first provide a detailed description of the main aggregate trends in CEO stock option grants. We then consider the cross-sectional heterogeneity in option-granting activity. We find that CEOs who either overinvest or underinvest subsequently receive fewer stock options as part of their compensation packages. CEOs who hold exercisable deeply-in-the-money options (overconfident CEOs) also receive fewer stock options in subsequent periods. Our findings provide insights into the dynamics of CEO compensation contracts. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate investment Stock option grants Ceo overconfidence |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12318 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541128 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Ferreira. DP12318 Changes in CEO Stock Option Grants: A Look at the Numbers. 2017. |
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