| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12271 |
| DP12271 Information Design under Falsification | |
| Vasiliki Skreta; Eduardo Perez-Richet | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-09-05 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We derive an optimal test when cheating is possible in the form of type falsification. Optimal design exploits the following trade-off: while cheating may lead to better grades, it devalues their meaning. We show that optimal tests can be derived among cheating- proof ones. Our optimal test has a single ‘failing’ grade, and a continuum of ‘passing’ grades. It makes the agent indifferent across all moderate levels of cheating. Good types never fail, but bad types may pass. An optimal test delivers at least half of the full information value. A three-grade optimal test also performs well |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12271 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541082 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vasiliki Skreta,Eduardo Perez-Richet. DP12271 Information Design under Falsification. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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