| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12267 |
| DP12267 Relational Contracts, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo; Giacomo Calzolari; Leonardo Felli; Johannes Koenen; Konrad O Stahl | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-09-04 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using unique data from buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry, we unveil a puzzle by which more trust in a relationship is associated with higher idiosyncratic investment, but also more competition. We develop a theoretical model of repeated procurement with non-contractible, buyer-specific investments rationalizing both observations. Against the idea that competition erodes rents needed to build trust and sustain relationships, we infer that trust and competition tend to go hand in hand. In our setting trust and rents from reduced supplier competition behave like substitutes, rather than complements as typically understood. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Trust Competition Hold-up problem Innovation Management practices Procurement Relational contracts Specific investment Supply chains |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12267 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541078 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Giacomo Calzolari,Leonardo Felli,et al. DP12267 Relational Contracts, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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