| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12065 |
| DP12065 Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening | |
| Thomas Gehrig | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-05-29 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We explore how the nature of the screening technology and the organization of the submission system affect the screening incentives of competing journals. Total screening in a duopolistic journal industry exceeds that of a monopoly. Exclusivity requirements for submissions induce more screening than systems with parallel submission. Interestingly, in the sequential screening model established journal rankings tend to reduce screening incentives. The screening technology determines whether the high-ranked or low-ranked journal have stronger screening incentives, which has implications for the long-run stability of established rankings. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Simultaneous versus sequential screening Information acquisition Assessment of research quality Competition between journals |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12065 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540876 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Gehrig. DP12065 Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening. 2017. |
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