| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12059 |
| DP12059 Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions | |
| Maria Guadalupe; Vicente Cunat; Mireia Gine | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-05-21 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the causal effects of anti-takeover provisions on takeovers. We decompose their effect on prices, takeover likelihood and target selection and explore the channels through which they change shareholders’ value. We provide causal estimates based on shareholder proposals and deal with the endogenous selection of targets through bounding techniques. Voting to remove an anti-takeover provision increases the annual takeover probability by 0.9% and increases premiums by 2.8%. The premium effect is driven by more related acquisitions, better matching and higher synergies when targets are less protected. We do not find evidence of a trade-off between premiums and takeover probabilities. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12059 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540870 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maria Guadalupe,Vicente Cunat,Mireia Gine. DP12059 Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
