| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11961 |
| DP11961 Credit Ratings and Market Information | |
| Joel Shapiro | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-04-13 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How does market information affect credit ratings? How do credit ratings affect market information? We analyze a model in which a credit rating agency's (CRA's) rating is followed by a market for credit risk that provides a public signal - the price. A more accurate rating decreases market informativeness, as it diminishes mispricing and, hence, incentives for investor information acquisition. On the other hand, more-informative trading increases CRA accuracy incentives by making rating inflation more transparent. If the first effect is strong, policies that increase reputational sanctions on CRAs decrease rating inflation, but also decrease the total amount of information. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Credit ratings |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11961 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540772 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joel Shapiro. DP11961 Credit Ratings and Market Information. 2017. |
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