| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11772 |
| DP11772 Confirmation Bias and Electoral Accountability | |
| Ben Lockwood | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-12 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper considers the implications of an important cognitive bias in information processing, confirmation bias, in a political agency setting. When voters have this bias and when only the politician's actions are observable before the election, it decreases pandering by the incumbent, and can raise voter welfare as a consequence. This result is driven by the fact that the noise aspect of confirmation bias, which decreases pandering, dominates the bounded rationality aspect, which increases it. The results generalize in several directions, including to the case where the voter can also observe payoffs with some probability before the election. We identify conditions when confirmation bias strengthens the case for decision-making by an elected rather than an appointed official. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Confirmation bias Accountability Elections |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11772 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540586 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ben Lockwood. DP11772 Confirmation Bias and Electoral Accountability. 2017. |
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