| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11737 |
| DP11737 Economic Crises and the Eligibility for the Lender of Last Resort: Evidence from Nineteenth Century France | |
| Clemens Jobst; Vincent Bignon | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-02 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that a central bank can more efficiently mitigate economic crises when it broadens eligibility for its discount facility to any safe asset or solvent agent. We use difference-in-differences panel regressions and emulate crises by studying how defaults of banks and non-agricultural firms were affected by the arrival of an agricultural disease. We exploit the specificities of the implementation of the discount window to deal with the endogeneity of the access to the central bank to the arrival of the crisis and local default rates. We find that broad eligibility reduced significantly the increase in the default rate when the shock hit the local economy. A counterfactual exercise shows that defaults would have been 10% to 15% higher if the central bank would have implemented the strictest eligibility rule. This effect is identified independently of changes in policy interest rates and the fiscal deficit. |
| 主题 | Economic History |
| 关键词 | Discount window Bagehot rule Collateral Default rate |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11737 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540551 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Clemens Jobst,Vincent Bignon. DP11737 Economic Crises and the Eligibility for the Lender of Last Resort: Evidence from Nineteenth Century France. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Clemens Jobst]的文章 |
| [Vincent Bignon]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Clemens Jobst]的文章 |
| [Vincent Bignon]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Clemens Jobst]的文章 |
| [Vincent Bignon]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
