| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11206 |
| DP11206 Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? Some experimental evidence | |
| Piero Gottardi; Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez; Francesco Feri | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-03-31 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that these markets are fragile. The reasons are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. Our subjects provide low-quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff. We show that this is not because subjects play a different (babbling) equilibrium. By analyzing subjects’ behavior in another game, we find that those adopting deceptive strategies tend to have envious or non-pro-social traits. The poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Experiment Cheap talk Auction Information acquisition Information sale |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11206 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540023 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Piero Gottardi,Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez,Francesco Feri. DP11206 Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? Some experimental evidence. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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