G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11135
DP11135 Breaking the Spell with Credit-Easing: Self-Confirming Credit Crises in Competitive Search Economies
Ramon Marimon
发表日期2016-02-25
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We show that credit crises can be Self-Confirming Equilibria (SCE), which provides a new rationale for policy interventions like, for example, the FRB’s TALF credit-easing program in 2009. We introduce SCE in competitive credit markets with directed search. These markets are efficient when lenders have correct beliefs about borrowers’ reactions to their offers. Nevertheless, credit crises - where high interest rates self-confirm high credit risk - can arise when lenders have correct beliefs only locally around equilibrium outcomes. Policy is needed because competition deters the socially optimal degree of information acquisition via individual experiments at low interest rates. A policy maker with the same beliefs as lenders will find it optimal to implement a targeted subsidy to induce low interest rates and, as a by-product, generate new information for the market. We provide evidence that the 2009 TALF was an example of such Credit Easing policy. We collect new micro-data on the ABS auto loans in the US before and after the policy intervention, and we test, successfully, our theory in this case.
主题Monetary Economics and Fluctuations
关键词Unconventional policies Learning Credit crisis Social experimentation Self-confirming equilibrium Directed search
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11135
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539952
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ramon Marimon. DP11135 Breaking the Spell with Credit-Easing: Self-Confirming Credit Crises in Competitive Search Economies. 2016.
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