| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10925 |
| DP10925 Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness | |
| David Martimort; Elisabetta Iossa | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-11-08 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze risk allocation and contractual choices when public procurement is plagued with moral hazard, private information on exogenous shocks, and threat of corruption. Complete contracts entail state-contingent clauses that compensate the contractor for shocks unrelated to his own effort. By improving insurance, those contracts reduce the agency cost of moral hazard. When the contractor has private information on revenues shocks, verifying messages on shocks realizations is costly. Incomplete contracts do not specify state-contingent clauses, thereby saving on verifiability costs. This makes incomplete contracts attractive even though they entail greater agency costs. Because of private information on contracting costs, a public official may have discretion to choose whether to procure under a complete or an incomplete contract. When the public official is corrupt, such delegation results in incomplete contracts being chosen too often. Empirical predictions on the use of incomplete contracts and policy implications on the benefits of standardized contracts are discussed. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Corruption Incomplete contracts Moral hazard Principal-agent-supervisor model Public-private partnerships Risk allocation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10925 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539755 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Martimort,Elisabetta Iossa. DP10925 Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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