| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10701 |
| DP10701 The Optimal Timing of UI Benefits: Theory and Evidence from Sweden | |
| Camille Landais; Johannes Spinnewijn; Jonas Kolsrud | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-07-12 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides a simple, yet general framework to analyze the optimal time profile of benefits during the unemployment spell. We derive simple sufficient-statistics formulae capturing the insurance value and incentive costs of unemployment benefits paid at different times during the unemployment spell. Our general approach allows to revisit and evaluate in a transparent way the separate arguments for inclining or declining profiles put forward in the theoretical literature. We then estimate our sufficient statistics using administrative data on unemployment, income and wealth in Sweden. First, we exploit duration-dependent kinks in the replacement rate and find that the moral hazard cost of benefits is larger when paid earlier in the spell. Second, we find that the drop in consumption determining the insurance value of benefits is large from the start of the spell, but further increases throughout the spell. On average, savings and credit play a limited role in smoothing consumption. Our evidence therefore indicate that the recent change from a flat to a declining benefit profile in Sweden has decreased welfare. In fact, the local welfare gains push towards an increasing rather than decreasing benefit profile over the spell. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Consumption smoothing Dynamic policy Sufficient statistics Unemployment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10701 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539532 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Camille Landais,Johannes Spinnewijn,Jonas Kolsrud. DP10701 The Optimal Timing of UI Benefits: Theory and Evidence from Sweden. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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