G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10682
DP10682 Leniency and Damages
Giancarlo Spagnolo; Paolo Buccirossi; Catarina Marvão
发表日期2015-06-28
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of leniency programs for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance that the cartel?s victims will bring a successful suit. A long legal debate culminated in an EU directive, adopted in November 2014, which seeks a balance between public and private enforcement. It protects the effectiveness of a leniency program by preventing the use of leniency statements in subsequent actions for damages. Our analysis shows such compromise is not required: limiting the cartel victims? ability to recover their loss is not necessary to preserve the effectiveness of a leniency program and may be counterproductive. We show that damage actions will actually improve its effectiveness, through a legal regime in which the civil liability of the immunity recipient is minimized and full access to all evidence collected by the competition authority, is granted to claimants, like in the US.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Private and public enforcement Cartels Competition policy Leniency program
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10682
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539514
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Giancarlo Spagnolo,Paolo Buccirossi,Catarina Marvão. DP10682 Leniency and Damages. 2015.
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