| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10671 |
| DP10671 Joint Design of Emission Tax and Trading Systems | |
| Bernard Caillaud; Gabrielle Demange | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-06-21 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the joint design of fiscal and cap-and-trade instruments in climate policies under uncertainty. Whether the optimal mechanism is a mixed policy (with some firms subject to a tax and others to a cap-and-trade) or a uniform one (with all firms subject to the same instrument) depends on parameters reflecting preferences, production, and, most importantly, the stochastic structure of the shocks affecting the economy. This framework is then used to address the issue of the non-cooperative design of ETS in various areas worldwide and to characterize the resulting inefficiency and excess in emission. We provide a strong Pareto argument in favor of merging ETS of different regions in the world and evaluate the welfare gains in each region. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Cap-and-trade mechanisms Climate policies Tax |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10671 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539503 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bernard Caillaud,Gabrielle Demange. DP10671 Joint Design of Emission Tax and Trading Systems. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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