| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10464 |
| DP10464 Personalized Pricing and Advertising: An Asymmetric Equilibrium Analysis | |
| Simon Anderson; Alicia Baik; Nathan Larson | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study personalized price competition with costly advertising among n quality-cost differentiated firms. Strategies involve mixing over both prices and whether to advertise. In equilibrium, only the top two firms advertise, earning ?Bertrand-like" profits. Welfare losses initially rise then fall with the ad cost, with losses due to excessive advertising and sales by the ?wrong " firm. When firms are symmetric, the symmetric equilibrium yields perverse comparative statics and is unstable. Our key results apply when demand is elastic, when ad costs are heterogeneous, and with noise in consumer tastes. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Consumer targeting Price dispersion Mixed strategy equilibrium Bertrand equilibrium Price advertising |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10464 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539296 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Simon Anderson,Alicia Baik,Nathan Larson. DP10464 Personalized Pricing and Advertising: An Asymmetric Equilibrium Analysis. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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