| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10442 |
| DP10442 Hawks and Doves at the FOMC | |
| Sylvester Eijffinger; Ronald Mahieu; Louis Raes | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-22 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we estimate ideal points of Bank Presidents and Board Governors at the FOMC. We use stated preferences from FOMC transcipts and estimate a hierarchical spatial voting model. We find a clear difference between the average Board Governor and Bank President. We find little evidence for difference in ideal points according to the appointing president in case of Bank Governors. Similarly career background has no clear effect on the ideal points. We find that the median ideal point at the FOMC has been fairly stable over our sample period (1989-2007) emphasizing the lack of a political appointment channel. We also show that there was considerable variation in the median ideal point of Bank Presidents and Board Governors, but that these seem to cancel each other out. Also the dispersion of opinions (the spread between the lowest and highest ideal point) varies over time, suggestion variation in agreement at the FOMC. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Central banks Committees Transcripts Ideal points Fomc |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10442 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539273 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sylvester Eijffinger,Ronald Mahieu,Louis Raes. DP10442 Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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