| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10397 |
| DP10397 The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism: Evidence from China | |
| Ekaterina Zhuravskaya; Petra Persson | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-08 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Performance-based promotion schemes in administrative hierarchies have limitations. Chinese provincial leaders, despite facing strong career concerns, make different policy decisions depending on their career backgrounds. Provincial party secretaries who rose from low to high positions within the province they govern (?locals?) spend a higher share of budgetary resources on education and health care and invest less in construction infrastructure than party secretaries who made their most significant career advancements in other provinces (?outsiders?). Identification comes from variation in central leadership and term limits. As the promotion mechanism rewards infrastructure investments, locals are less likely to be promoted at the end of the term. We explore various mechanisms and provide evidence that the difference between locals and outsiders is not driven by knowledge or experience. Several pieces of evidence suggest that locals cater to low-level provincial elites, who helped them rise to power. Thus, local career trajectories limit the power of career concerns by fostering competing allegiances. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Career concerns Federalism Hierarchies Public goods Autocracy China |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10397 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539228 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ekaterina Zhuravskaya,Petra Persson. DP10397 The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism: Evidence from China. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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