| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10323 |
| DP10323 Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule | |
| Guido Tabellini; Massimo Bordignon; Tommaso Nannicini | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-12-21 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We compare single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility is smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Electoral rules Policy volatility Regression discontinuity design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10323 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539155 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guido Tabellini,Massimo Bordignon,Tommaso Nannicini. DP10323 Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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