| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10143 |
| DP10143 The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability | |
| Alex Edmans; Pierre Chaigneau | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-09-21 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that the informativeness principle does not automatically extend to settings with limited liability. Even if a signal is informative about effort, it may have no value for contracting. An agent with limited liability is paid zero for certain output realizations. Thus, even if these output realizations are accompanied by an unfavorable signal, the payment cannot fall further and so the principal cannot make use of the signal. Similarly, a principal with limited liability may be unable to increase payments after a favorable signal. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for signals to have positive value. Under bilateral limited liability and a monotone likelihood ratio, the value of information is non-monotonic in output, and the principal is willing to pay more for information at intermediate output levels. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Contract theory Informativeness principle Limited liability Options Pay-for-luck Principal-agent model Relative performance evaluation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10143 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538976 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alex Edmans,Pierre Chaigneau. DP10143 The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Alex Edmans]的文章 |
| [Pierre Chaigneau]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Alex Edmans]的文章 |
| [Pierre Chaigneau]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Alex Edmans]的文章 |
| [Pierre Chaigneau]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
