| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP9708
|
| DP9708 Blockholders and Corporate Governance |
| Alex Edmans
|
| 发表日期 | 2013-10-27
|
| 出版年 | 2013
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the different channels through which blockholders (large shareholders) engage in corporate governance. In classical models, blockholders exert governance through direct intervention in a firm?s operations, otherwise known as ?voice.? These theories have motivated empirical research on the determinants and consequences of activism. More recent models show that blockholders can govern through the alternative mechanism of ?exit? ? selling their shares if the manager underperforms. These theories give rise to new empirical studies on the two-way relationship between blockholders and financial markets, linking corporate finance with asset pricing. Blockholders may also worsen governance by extracting private benefits of control or pursuing objectives other than firm value maximization. I highlight the empirical challenges in identifying causal effects of and on blockholders, and the typical strategies attempted to achieve identification. I close with directions for future research. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Large shareholders
Governance
voice
Activism
Exit
Microstructure
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9708
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538544
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Alex Edmans. DP9708 Blockholders and Corporate Governance. 2013.
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