G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9708
DP9708 Blockholders and Corporate Governance
Alex Edmans
发表日期2013-10-27
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the different channels through which blockholders (large shareholders) engage in corporate governance. In classical models, blockholders exert governance through direct intervention in a firm?s operations, otherwise known as ?voice.? These theories have motivated empirical research on the determinants and consequences of activism. More recent models show that blockholders can govern through the alternative mechanism of ?exit? ? selling their shares if the manager underperforms. These theories give rise to new empirical studies on the two-way relationship between blockholders and financial markets, linking corporate finance with asset pricing. Blockholders may also worsen governance by extracting private benefits of control or pursuing objectives other than firm value maximization. I highlight the empirical challenges in identifying causal effects of and on blockholders, and the typical strategies attempted to achieve identification. I close with directions for future research.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Large shareholders Governance voice Activism Exit Microstructure
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9708
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538544
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alex Edmans. DP9708 Blockholders and Corporate Governance. 2013.
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