| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9674 |
| DP9674 How does corporate governance affect bank capitalization strategies? | |
| Harry Huizinga; Asli Demirgüç-Kunt; Kebin Ma; Deniz Anginer | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-10-06 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines how corporate governance and executive compensation affect bank capitalization strategies for an international sample of banks over the 2003-2011 period. ?Good? corporate governance, which favors shareholder interests, is found to give rise to lower bank capitalization. Boards of intermediate size, separation of the CEO and chairman roles, and an absence of anti-takeover provisions, in particular, lead to low bank capitalization. However, executive options and stock wealth invested in the bank is associated with better capitalization except just before the crisis in 2006. In that year stock options wealth was associated with lower capitalization which suggests that potential gains from taking on more bank risk outweighed the prospect of additional loss. Banks? tendency to continue payouts to shareholders after experiencing negative income shocks are shown to reflect executive risk-taking incentives. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Bank capital Dividend payouts Corporate governance Executive compensation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9674 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538510 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Harry Huizinga,Asli Demirgüç-Kunt,Kebin Ma,et al. DP9674 How does corporate governance affect bank capitalization strategies?. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
