| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9612 |
| DP9612 Information Management in Banking Crises | |
| Joel Shapiro; David Skeie | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-08-25 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A regulator resolving a bank faces two audiences: depositors, who may run if they believe the regulator will not provide capital, and banks, which may take excess risk if they believe the regulator will provide capital. When the regulator's cost of injecting capital is private information, it manages expectations by using costly signals: (i) A regulator with a low cost of injecting capital may forbear on bad banks to signal toughness and reduce risk taking, and (ii) A regulator with a high cost of injecting capital may bail out bad banks to increase confidence and prevent runs. Regulators perform more informative stress tests when the market is pessimistic. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank regulation Financial crisis Reputation Sovereign debt crisis Stress tests |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9612 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538447 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joel Shapiro,David Skeie. DP9612 Information Management in Banking Crises. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Joel Shapiro]的文章 |
| [David Skeie]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Joel Shapiro]的文章 |
| [David Skeie]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Joel Shapiro]的文章 |
| [David Skeie]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
