| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9578 |
| DP9578 Group Lending Without Joint Liability | |
| Maitreesh Ghatak; Thiemo Fetzer; Jonathan de Quidt | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-07-28 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper contrasts individual liability lending with and without groups to joint liability lending. By doing so, we shed light on an apparent shift away from joint liability lending towards individual liability lending by some microfinance institutions First we show that individual lending with or without groups may constitute a welfare improvement so long as borrowers have sufficient social capital to sustain mutual insurance. Second, we explore how a purely mechanical argument in favor of the use of groups - namely lower transaction costs - may actually be used explicitly by lenders to encourage the creation of social capital. We also carry out some simulations to evaluate quantitatively the welfare impact of alternative forms of lending, and how they relate to social capital. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Micro finance Group lending Joint liability Mutual insurance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9578 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538414 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maitreesh Ghatak,Thiemo Fetzer,Jonathan de Quidt. DP9578 Group Lending Without Joint Liability. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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