| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9505 |
| DP9505 Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection | |
| Robert J. Gary-Bobo; Alain Trannoy | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-06-16 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We completely characterize the set of second-best optimal "menus" of student-loan contracts in a simple economy with risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans and an elementary optimal income-tax problem à la Mirrlees. This combination can be called a graduate tax. There are two categories of second-best optima: the equal treatment and the separating allocations. The equal treatment case is obtained when the social weights of student types are close to their population frequencies; the expected utilities of different types are then equalized, conditional on the event of success on the labor market. But individuals are ex ante unequal because of differing probabilities of success, and ex post unequal, because the income tax trades off incentives and insurance (redistribution). In separating optima, the talented types bear more risk than the less-talented ones; they arise only if the social weight of the talented types is sufficiently high. The second-best optimal graduate tax provides incomplete insurance because of moral hazard; it typically involves cross-subsidies; generically, it cannot be decomposed as the sum of an optimal income tax depending only on earnings, and a loan repayment, depending only on education. Therefore, optimal loan repayments must be income-contingent. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Student loans Optimal taxation Asymmetric information Mechanism design Higher education |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9505 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538341 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert J. Gary-Bobo,Alain Trannoy. DP9505 Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
