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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP9373 |
DP9373 Winning by Losing: Incentive Incompatibility in Multiple Qualifiers | |
Konstantin Sonin; Dmitry Dagaev | |
发表日期 | 2013-03-10 |
出版年 | 2013 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | In sport tournaments, the rules are presumably structured in a way that any team cannot be better off (e.g., to advance to the next round of competition) by losing instead of winning a game. Starting with a real-world example, we demonstrate that the existing national rules of awarding places for the UEFA Champions Leagues and the UEFA Europa League, which are based on the results of the national championship, a round-robin tournament, and the national cup, a knock-out tournament, might produce a situation where a team will be strictly better off by losing a game. Competition rules of the European qualification tournament to the World Cup 2014 suffer from the same problem. We show formally that in qualifying systems consisting of several round-robin tournaments, monotonic aggregating rules always leave open such a possibility. Then we consider qualifying systems consisting of a round-robin tournament (championship) and a knock-out tournament (cup). We show that any redistribution rule that allows the cup's runner-up to advance in the case that the cup's winner advances based on its place in a championship, has the same drawback, and discuss possible fixes. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Football Organization Tournaments Uefa champions league |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9373 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538211 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konstantin Sonin,Dmitry Dagaev. DP9373 Winning by Losing: Incentive Incompatibility in Multiple Qualifiers. 2013. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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