| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9163 |
| DP9163 Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment | |
| Bernardo Guimaraes | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-10-07 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies fiscal policy in a model of sovereign debt and default. A time-inconsistency problem arises: since the price of past debt cannot be affected by current fiscal policy and governments cannot credibly commit to a certain path of tax rates, debtor countries choose suboptimally low fiscal adjustments. An international lender of last resort, capable of designing an implicit contract that coax debtors into a tougher fiscal stance via the provision of cheap (but senior) lending in times of crisis, can work as a commitment device and improve social welfare. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal adjustment Imf Sovereign debt Sovereign default Time inconsistency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9163 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537998 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bernardo Guimaraes. DP9163 Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment. 2012. |
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