| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9013 |
| DP9013 Geographic Access Rules and Investments | |
| Steffen Hoernig; Carlo Cambini | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-06-17 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze competition between vertically integrated infrastructure operators that provide access in different geographical areas. A regulator may impose a uniform access price, set local access rates, or deregulate access locally. We analyze the impact of these alternative regulatory regimes on network investments. While cost-based access leads to both suboptimal rollout and duplication, uniform access prices bring too much duplication. Deregulation in competitive areas can spur investment and lead to social optimum, or call for continued regulatory intervention, depending on the resulting wholesale equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Geographical access regulation Infrastructure investment Next generation networks |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9013 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537848 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steffen Hoernig,Carlo Cambini. DP9013 Geographic Access Rules and Investments. 2012. |
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