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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP8923 |
DP8923 Product quality, competition, and multi-purchasing | |
Simon Anderson; Hans Jarle Kind; Øystein Foros | |
发表日期 | 2012-04-01 |
出版年 | 2012 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | In a Hotelling duopoly model, we introduce quality that is more appreciated by closer consumers. Then higher common quality raises equilibrium prices, in contrast to the standard neutrality result. Furthermore, we allow consumers to buy one out of two goods (single-purchase) or both (multi-purchase). Prices are strategically independent when some consumers multi-purchase because suppliers price the incremental benefit to marginal consumers. In a multi-purchase regime, there is a hump-shaped relationship between equilibrium prices and quality when quality functions overlap. If quality is sufficiently good, it might be a dominant strategy for each supplier to price high and eliminate multi-purchase. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Hotelling model with quality Multi-purchase Incremental pricing Content competition |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8923 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537761 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Simon Anderson,Hans Jarle Kind,Øystein Foros. DP8923 Product quality, competition, and multi-purchasing. 2012. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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