全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP8374 Smiling is a Costly Signal of Cooperation Opportunities: Experimental Evidence from a Trust Game

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP8374
	DP8374 Smiling is a Costly Signal of Cooperation Opportunities: Experimental Evidence from a Trust Game
	Paul Seabright; Astrid Hopfensitz; Samuele Centorrino; Elodie Djemai; Manfred Milinski
发表日期	2011-05-01
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	We test the hypothesis that "genuine" or "convincing" smiling is a costly signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Potential trustees in a trust game made video clips for viewing by potential trusters before the latter decided whether to send them money. Ratings of the genuineness of smiles vary across clips; it is difficult to make convincing smiles to order. We argue that smiling convincingly is costly, because smiles from trustees playing for higher stakes are rated as significantly more convincing, so that rewards appear to induce effort. We show that it induces cooperation: smiles rated as more convincing strongly predict judgments about the trustworthiness of trustees, and willingness to send them money. Finally, we show that it is a honest signal: those smiling convincingly return more money on average to senders. Convincing smiles are to some extent a signal of the intrinsic character of trustees: less honest individuals find smiling convincingly more difficult. They are also informative about the greater amounts that trustees playing for higher stakes have available to share: it is harder to smile convincingly if you have less to offer.
主题	Industrial Organization
关键词	Costly signaling Experiment Smiling Trust game Video
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp8374
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537211
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Paul Seabright,Astrid Hopfensitz,Samuele Centorrino,et al. DP8374 Smiling is a Costly Signal of Cooperation Opportunities: Experimental Evidence from a Trust Game. 2011.