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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP8266 |
DP8266 Why Stare Decisis? | |
Luca Anderlini; Leonardo Felli; Alessandro Riboni | |
发表日期 | 2011-02-21 |
出版年 | 2011 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | All Courts rule ex-post, after most economic decisions are sunk. This might generate a time-inconsistency problem. From an ex-ante perspective, Courts will have the (ex-post) temptation to be excessively lenient. This observation is at the root of the principle of stare decisis. Stare decisis forces Courts to weigh the benefits of leniency towards the current parties against the beneficial effects that tougher decisions have on future ones. We study these dynamics and find that stare decisis guarantees that precedents evolve towards ex-ante efficient decisions, thus alleviating the Courts? time-inconsistency problem. However, the dynamics do not converge to full efficiency |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Case law Precedents Stare decisis Time-inconsistency |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8266 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537103 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luca Anderlini,Leonardo Felli,Alessandro Riboni. DP8266 Why Stare Decisis?. 2011. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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