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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP7651 |
DP7651 Learning and Complementarities: Implications for Speculative Attacks | |
Itay Goldstein; Kathy Yuan; Emre Ozdenoren | |
发表日期 | 2010-01-24 |
出版年 | 2010 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study a model where the aggregate trading of currency speculators reveals new information to the central bank and affects its policy decision. We show that the learning process gives rise to coordination motives among speculators leading to large currency attacks and introducing non-fundamental volatility into exchange rates and policy decisions. We show that the central bank can improve the ex-ante effectiveness of its policy by committing to put a lower weight ex-post on the information from the market, and that transparency may either increase or decrease the effectiveness of learning from the market, depending on how it is implemented. |
主题 | Financial Economics |
关键词 | Coordination Currency attacks Feedback effects Financial markets Global games Heterogenous information Strategic complementarities |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7651 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536488 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Itay Goldstein,Kathy Yuan,Emre Ozdenoren. DP7651 Learning and Complementarities: Implications for Speculative Attacks. 2010. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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