| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7613 |
| DP7613 Competition with exclusive contracts and market-share discounts | |
| Giacomo Calzolari; Vincenzo Denicolò | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of the market for individual reputation, an indicator of regard by one?s peers and others. The central questions are: 1) Does the quantity of exposures raise reputation independent of their quality? and 2) Assuming that overall quality matters for reputation, does the quality of an individual?s most important exposure have an extra effect on reputation? Using evidence for academic economists, we find that, conditional on its impact, the quantity of output has no or even a negative effect on each of a number of proxies for reputation, and very little evidence that a scholar?s most influential work provides any extra enhancement of reputation. Quality ranking matters more than absolute quality. Data on mobility and salaries show, on the contrary, substantial positive effects of quantity, independent of quality. We test various explanations for the differences between the determinants of reputation and salary. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Quality/quantity trade-off Mobility Salary determination |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7613 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536450 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giacomo Calzolari,Vincenzo Denicolò. DP7613 Competition with exclusive contracts and market-share discounts. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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