| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6894 |
| DP6894 A Political Economy Model of Merger Policy in International Markets | |
| Massimo Motta; Michele Ruta | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-06-27 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse a simple model of dynamic moral hazard in which there is a clear and tractable trade-off; between static and dynamic incentives. In our model, a principal wants an agent to complete a project. The agent undertakes unobservable effort, which affects in each period the probability that the project is completed. The principal pays only on completion of the project. We characterise the contracts that the principal sets, with and without commitment. We show that with full commitment, the contract involves the agent?s value and wage declining over time, in order to give the agent incentives to exert effort. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Continuous time Moral hazard Principal-agent model Project completion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6894 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535730 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Motta,Michele Ruta. DP6894 A Political Economy Model of Merger Policy in International Markets. 2008. |
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