| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6836 |
| DP6836 Patterns of Restructuring: The U.S. Class 1 Railroads from 1984 to 2004 | |
| Guido Friebel; Gerard McCullough; Laura Padilla Angulo | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-05-27 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many convicted cartels have a leader which is substantially larger than its rivals. In a setting where firms face indivisible costs of collusion, we show that: (i) firms may have an incentive to merge so as to create asymmetric market structures since this enables the merged firm to cover the indivisible cost associated with cartel leadership; and (ii) forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with a higher risk of collusion. Thus, these results have implications for the practice of the current EU and US merger policies. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Collusion Cost asymmetries Merger policy Cartels Ring leader |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6836 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535673 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guido Friebel,Gerard McCullough,Laura Padilla Angulo. DP6836 Patterns of Restructuring: The U.S. Class 1 Railroads from 1984 to 2004. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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