| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6679 |
| DP6679 Forced to be Rich? Returns to Compulsory Schooling in Britain | |
| Robert A Hart; Paul J. Devereux | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions in which commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure each other through both formal contracts and informal agreements, that is, self-enforcing agreements specifying voluntary transfers. This theoretical setting nests the case of complete markets and the case where only informal agreements are available. We derive a system of non-linear equations for income and consumption growth. A key prediction of our model is that both variables are affected by lagged consumption as a consequence of the interplay of formal and informal contracting possibilities. In a semi-parametric setting, we prove identification, derive testable restrictions and estimate the model with the use of data from Pakistan villages. Empirical results are consistent with the economic arguments. Incentive constraints due to self-enforcement bind with positive probability and formal contracts are used to reduce this probability. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Contracts Incomplete markets Informal transfers Risk sharing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6679 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535516 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert A Hart,Paul J. Devereux. DP6679 Forced to be Rich? Returns to Compulsory Schooling in Britain. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
