| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6460 |
| DP6460 Intellectual Property Provisions in North-South Trade Agreements | |
| Kamal Saggi | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the rationale for multilateral agreements to limit investment subsidies. The welfare ranking of symmetric multilateral subsidy games is shown to depend on whether or not investment levels are "friendly", raising rival profits in total, and/or strategic complements, raising rival profits at the margin. In both Cournot and Bertrand competition, when spillovers are low and competition is intense (because goods are close substitutes), national-welfare-maximizing governments will over-subsidize investment, and banning subsidies would improve welfare. When spillovers are high, national governments under-subsidize from a global welfare perspective, but the subsidy game is welfare superior to non-intervention. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Industrial policy Investment subsidies Oligopoly R&d spillovers Strategic trade policy Subsidy wars |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6460 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535320 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kamal Saggi. DP6460 Intellectual Property Provisions in North-South Trade Agreements. 2007. |
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