全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP6232 Total Work, Gender and Social Norms

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP6232
	DP6232 Total Work, Gender and Social Norms
	Daniel S. Hamermesh; Michael Burda; Philippe Weil
发表日期	2007-03-28
出版年	2007
语种	英语
摘要	We model takeovers as a bargaining process and explain termination fees for, both, the target and the acquirer, subject to parties? bargaining power and outside options. In equilibrium, termination fees are offered by firms with outside options in exchange for a greater share of merger synergies. Termination fees decrease in firms? bargaining power, and increase in firms? outside options. We find that a merger with the second highest bidder, including a termination fee, can lead to equally high premiums as a merger with the highest bidder, without a termination fee. This novel result directly contrasts the agency cost perspective, which argues that termination provisions may be used by managers to lock into acquirers that do not generate the highest shareholder value. Further, even in a merger with the highest bidder and in the absence of bidding related costs, a termination fee is not necessarily a deal protection device, but can be used to improve shareholder value. Our bargaining model offers an alternative to auction related explanations of termination fees, like cost compensation or seller commitment.
主题	Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization
关键词	Bargaining Break-up fees Lockups Mergers and acquisitions Outside option Termination fees
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp6232
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535065
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Daniel S. Hamermesh,Michael Burda,Philippe Weil. DP6232 Total Work, Gender and Social Norms. 2007.