| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6073 |
| DP6073 Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications | |
| Johan Stennek; Thomas P. Tangerås | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-02-14 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We compare the trading performance of independent directors and other officers of the firm. We find that independent directors earn positive and substantial abnormal returns when they purchase their company stock, and that the difference with the same firm's officers is relatively small at most horizons. The results are robust to controlling for firm fixed effects and to using a variety of alternative specifications. Executive officers and independent directors make higher returns in firms with weaker governance and the gap between these two groups widens in such firms. Independent directors who sit in audit committees earn higher return than other independent directors at the same firm. Finally, independent directors earn significantly higher returns than the market when they sell the company stock in a window before bad news and around a restatement announcement. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Boards of directors Corporate governance Independent directors |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6073 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534912 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Johan Stennek,Thomas P. Tangerås. DP6073 Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
