| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6055 |
| DP6055 Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets | |
| Jaume Ventura; Fernando Broner; Alberto Martin | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-01-21 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how complementarities and intellectual property rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results relay when a firm will wish to sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the effects of complementary assets on wages and on worker initiative. We argue that firms strongly protected by property rights may not sue leaving workers in order to motivate effort, while firms weakly protected by complementary assets must sue in order to obtain positive profits. Firms with more complementary assets pay higher wages (and have lower turnover), but such higher pay has a detrimental effect on worker initiative. Our analysis suggests that strengthened property rights protection reduces turnover costs but weakens worker initiative. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | entrepreneurship Innovation Ipr Litigation Personnel economics R&d Start-ups |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6055 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534897 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jaume Ventura,Fernando Broner,Alberto Martin. DP6055 Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
