| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP5483
|
| DP5483 The Social Cost of Foreign Exchange Reserves |
| Dani Rodrik
|
| 发表日期 | 2006-01-30
|
| 出版年 | 2006
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper analyses the interplay between social structure and information exchange in two competing activities, crime and labour. We consider a dynamic model in which individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups, referred to as dyads. There are multiple equilibria. If jobs are badly paid and/or crime is profitable, unemployment benefits have to be low enough to prevent workers for staying too long in the unemployment status because they are vulnerable to crime activities. If, instead, jobs are well paid and/or crime is not profitable, unemployment benefits have to be high enough to induce workers to stay unemployed rather to commit crime because they are less vulnerable to crime activities. Also, in segregated neighbourhoods characterized by high interactions between peers, a policy only based on punishment and arrest will not be efficient in reducing crime. It has to be accompanied by other types of policies that take into account social interactions. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics
; Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Social interaction
Crime
Labour market
Forward-looking agents
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5483
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534340
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Dani Rodrik. DP5483 The Social Cost of Foreign Exchange Reserves. 2006.
|
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