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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP5248 |
DP5248 Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools | |
Simon Burgess; Carol Propper; Deborah Wilson; Helen Slater | |
发表日期 | 2005-09-23 |
出版年 | 2005 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause has long been suspected of creating a free rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations. To address this issue, we model multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation. We show that an optimal mechanism induces only the largest exporters to participate in negotiations over any product, thus providing a rationalization for the Principal supplier rule. We also show that, through this channel, equilibrium tariffs vary according to the Herfindahl index of export shares: higher concentration in a sector reduces free riding and thus causes a lower tariff. Estimation of our model using sector-level tariff data for the US provides strong support for this relationship. |
主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
关键词 | Most-favoured nation (mfn) clause Free riding Principal supplier rule |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5248 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534119 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Simon Burgess,Carol Propper,Deborah Wilson,et al. DP5248 Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools. 2005. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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