| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5242 |
| DP5242 Experts vs Discounters: Competition and Market Unravelling When Consumers Do Not Know What they Need | |
| Rudolf Kerschbamer; Uwe Dulleck | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In an important paper, Aghion and Bolton (1987) argue that a buyer and a seller may agree on high liquidation damages in order to extract rents from future suppliers. As this may distort future trade, it may be socially wasteful. We argue that Aghion and Bolton's analysis is incomplete in some respects, as they do not model the entry of new suppliers. We construct a model where entry is costly, so that entering suppliers have to earn a quasi-rent in order to recoup the entry cost. Reducing an entrant's profits by the help of a breach penalty then reduces the probability of entry in the first place, thus making a breach penalty less attractive for the contracting parties. We show that the initial buyer and seller only have incentives to include a breach penalty if there is excessive entry without it. Forcing the initial buyer and seller to eliminate the breach penalty reduces welfare. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Exclusive contracts Breach penalties Entry Efficiency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5242 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534114 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rudolf Kerschbamer,Uwe Dulleck. DP5242 Experts vs Discounters: Competition and Market Unravelling When Consumers Do Not Know What they Need. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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