| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4788 |
| DP4788 Favouritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross-Fund Subsidization | |
| Pedro Pinto Matos; Massimo Massa; José-Miguel Gaspar | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Under symmetric information, a job protection law that says that a principal who has hired an agent today must also employ them tomorrow can only reduce the two parties? total surplus. The law restricts the principal?s possibilities to maximize their profit, which equals the total surplus, because they leave no rent to the agent. However, under asymmetric information, a principal must leave a rent to the agent, and hence profit maximization is no longer equivalent to surplus maximization. Therefore, a job protection law can increase the expected total surplus by restricting the principal?s possibilities to inefficiently reduce the agent?s rent. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Job security Employment protection Labour market rigidities |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4788 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533702 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pedro Pinto Matos,Massimo Massa,José-Miguel Gaspar. DP4788 Favouritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross-Fund Subsidization. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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