| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4178 |
| DP4178 Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort | |
| Regina Riphahn; Axel Engellandt | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate if the proxy voting process transmits valuable information from shareholders to management. A simple strategic voting model is developed and tested in a large sample of management proposals. The evidence suggests that voting is strategic in the sense that shareholders take into account the information of the other shareholders when making their voting decisions. The structural estimation suggests that strategic voting saves up to 30% of the value at stake in a proposal compared to naive voting strategies, especially for voting on governance proposals. The data also suggest that super majority requirements are never optimal. We conclude that shareholder meetings have an advisory function in addition to the disciplining role typically emphasized in the literature. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Shareholder meeting Information aggregation Strategic voting Sincere voting Super majority |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4178 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533149 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Regina Riphahn,Axel Engellandt. DP4178 Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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