全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP4118 Explaining Differences in Hospital Performance: Does the Answer Lie in the Labour Market?

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP4118
	DP4118 Explaining Differences in Hospital Performance: Does the Answer Lie in the Labour Market?
	Simon Burgess; Carol Propper; Denise Gossage
发表日期	2003-11-23
出版年	2003
语种	英语
摘要	This Paper examines how different unionization structures affect firms' innovation incentives and industry employment. We distinguish three modes of unionization with increasing degree of centralization: (1) ?decentralization? where wages are determined independently at the firm-level, (2) ?coordination? where one industry union sets individual wages for all firms, and (3) ?centralization? where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all firms. While firms' investment incentives are largest under ?centralization?, investment incentives are non-monotone in the degree of centralization: ?decentralization? carries higher investment incentives than ?coordination?. Labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralizing unionization structures or through non-discrimination rules.
主题	Industrial Organization
关键词	Unions Innovation Centralization Hold-up
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp4118
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533093
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Simon Burgess,Carol Propper,Denise Gossage. DP4118 Explaining Differences in Hospital Performance: Does the Answer Lie in the Labour Market?. 2003.